September 26, 2026: By the end of the year, the Russian security service, the FSB, will have created paramilitary units; this will include leadership changes, with FSB officers with extensive military experience taking control of the new organization.

This is nothing new. Fourteen years ago, several hundred members of the GRU 45th Spetsnaz Regiment were sent in, disguised as civilians, to create a “popular uprising” that would enable Russia to annex Crimea. Some of the uniformed men who then took control of Crimea were apparently hired, pro-Russia locals, but the core of this “local militia” was men with obvious military training who had been using those skills recently. These were the spetsnaz men, and they were obviously in charge. Nearly 60 percent of Crimeans then were Russian, and GRU had probably been recruiting for years. Some of these locals admitted that money changed hands and they were glad to be part of the effort that returned control of Crimea to Mother Russia. When you use armed amateurs, you must expect this sort of thing, and these comments did not sidetrack the takeover plan. The armed men were obviously briefed, and most would not talk to reporters or even let journalists get close. But a few of these gunmen just could not resist a reporter with a camera crew looking for a few snappy comments for the evening news. Some of the anonymous armed men may be civilian contractors (which Russia exports to some parts of the world), and some were just pro-Russian veterans willing to take a gun and endure a bit of risk.

Currently, new FSB military units, consisting of a dozen to several hundred men, will be sent where needed and then withdrawn once things calm down. This began with a plan for one of two senior counterintelligence officials to take control of the FSB. This is to enhance new FSB activities, including deploying mobile fire groups equipped with heavy machine guns to counter Ukrainian drone strikes. These units, sometimes staffed by army reservists and sometimes by people outside the military, were created in regions far from the Ukrainian border, including Leningrad, Karelia, North Ossetia, Siberia, and Archangel. In occupied Donetsk, FSB‑run mobile fire groups are integrated into the “Donbas Dome” air defense system, and similar units have been formed in North Ossetia. This marks a shift from the FSB’s traditional intelligence and counterintelligence roles toward direct combat and security operations.

Countrywide, the FSB has gained massive legal powers, including authority to control foreign access to Russian ports, regulate scientific cooperation with foreigners, and oversee new detention facilities within its system. These measures, combined with control over sea routes, property nationalization, and restrictions on information, are described as signs that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with the West, with the FSB playing a central role.

While not an official “militarization” in the sense of creating a standing army, the FSB’s growing involvement in armed operations, its integration into regional defense systems, and its expanded legal powers suggest a militarized expansion of its mission. This aligns with broader Kremlin strategies to centralize security control and prepare for long‑term conflict, even without formal martial law.

The leadership reorganization is expected to be finalized by the end of 2026. Armed FSB members will exercise jurisdiction over ports and other facilities. Overall, the FSB will exercise more authority on the ground in key areas of Russia.